Vulnerability-Lookup contains an
authentication weakness in its account activation and password-recovery
mechanism. Activation and recovery links were generated using stateless
signed tokens containing only the user's login. Although the token
signature and age were validated, the application did not track whether a
token had already been successfully used. As a result, a captured
activation or password-recovery link remained valid for the entire
configured TOKEN_VALIDITY_PERIOD, even after the associated password had been changed.
An attacker who obtains a valid
activation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times
during its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take
control of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a
specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across
activation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound
tokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user
account. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change,
making tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any
previously issued token. The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change.
Successful exploitation requires
the attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link,
but does not require knowledge of the victim's existing password or an
authenticated session.
authentication weakness in its account activation and password-recovery
mechanism. Activation and recovery links were generated using stateless
signed tokens containing only the user's login. Although the token
signature and age were validated, the application did not track whether a
token had already been successfully used. As a result, a captured
activation or password-recovery link remained valid for the entire
configured TOKEN_VALIDITY_PERIOD, even after the associated password had been changed.
An attacker who obtains a valid
activation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times
during its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take
control of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a
specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across
activation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound
tokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user
account. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change,
making tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any
previously issued token. The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change.
Successful exploitation requires
the attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link,
but does not require knowledge of the victim's existing password or an
authenticated session.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| vulnerability-lookup | vulnerability-lookup | unaffected |
|
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Project Subscriptions
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Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Wed, 12 Aug 2026 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Vulnerability-Lookup contains an authentication weakness in its account activation and password-recovery mechanism. Activation and recovery links were generated using stateless signed tokens containing only the user's login. Although the token signature and age were validated, the application did not track whether a token had already been successfully used. As a result, a captured activation or password-recovery link remained valid for the entire configured TOKEN_VALIDITY_PERIOD, even after the associated password had been changed. An attacker who obtains a valid activation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times during its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take control of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across activation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound tokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user account. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change, making tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any previously issued token. The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link, but does not require knowledge of the victim's existing password or an authenticated session. | |
| Title | Reusable Account Activation and Recovery Tokens Allow Repeated Account Takeover in vulnerability-lookup | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-294 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CIRCL
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-12T17:07:39.056Z
Reserved: 2026-08-12T14:32:51.876Z
Link: CVE-2026-73431
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-12T15:18:33.483
Modified: 2026-08-12T15:18:33.483
Link: CVE-2026-73431
Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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Weaknesses