| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper Link Resolution (CWE-59) in `/usr/bin/larm_starter` in Loytec L-INX, L-GATE, L-ROC, L-IOB, L-DALI, L-VIS and L-PAD through 8.4.16 on LINX-A64 allows an authenticated `larmapp` attacker to make `/etc/passwd` writable by the `larmapp` group (leading to root privilege escalation) via a symlink attack on `/etc/lighttpd/ssl/server.pem`. |
| Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows File Discovery.
The SSH_FXP_READLINK handler in ssh_sftpd sends the raw result of file:read_link/2 to the client without calling chroot_filename/2 to strip the backend root prefix. An authenticated SFTP client can create a symlink inside the chroot pointing to /; ssh_sftpd resolves the target to the absolute backend root and stores it on disk. Reading the symlink back via SSH_FXP_READLINK returns that absolute path, for example /data/sftp, instead of the chrooted value /.
The information disclosed is the absolute filesystem path of the SFTP root directory and of any symlink targets within it. No file contents, credentials, or access to paths outside the root directory are obtainable through this issue alone.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 before 6.0.1, 5.5.2.1 and 5.2.11.8. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.6, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper link resolution before file access ('link following') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access. |
| decompress before 4.2.2 allows arbitrary hardlink creation during archive extraction, enabling file read disclosure and file corruption. When processing hardlink entries (type === 'link'), the x.linkname field from the archive is passed directly to fs.link() without validation (index.js line 113). An attacker can craft an archive with a hardlink entry whose linkname is an absolute path to any file on the same filesystem. This creates a hardlink inside the extraction directory that shares the same inode as the target file, enabling both reading and overwriting the original file's content. Hardlinks are limited to files on the same filesystem and cannot target directories. |
| An insecure symlink following vulnerability exists in Canonical ubuntu-pro-client (formerly ubuntu-advantage-tools) within the pro collect-logs command framework. The utility creates or utilizes predictable temporary file paths or user-accessible log directories when gathering diagnostic information without verifying the file type or ownership. An unprivileged local attacker can exploit this behavior by creating a symbolic link (symlink) at a predictable destination path pointing to an arbitrary, root-readable file (such as /etc/shadow or private files within /root). When a root administrator or operator subsequently executes the pro collect-logs command, the tool follows the user-controlled symlink, reads the target file, and compresses its contents into the resulting diagnostic support archive. Because the output archive remains readable by the unprivileged user, the attacker can extract and read the sensitive root-owned files, leading to a complete information disclosure of system secrets. |
| Data::Buffer::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in buf_generic.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0666). O_EXCL blocks a pre-seeded file on create, but the mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable), and O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed when the segment is attached.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted symlink at the path redirects the open to another file. |
| Data::Deque::Shared versions before 0.06 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in deque.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::Graph::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in graph.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::NDArray::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in ndarray.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::PubSub::Shared versions before 0.07 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in pubsub.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::ReqRep::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in reqrep.h with open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666), for both the request-reply and the integer-variant segments. The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::SortedSet::Shared versions before 0.03 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in sortedset.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::RadixTree::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in radix.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::HashMap::Shared versions before 0.14 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in shm_generic.h with open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in roaring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::RingBuffer::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in ring.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::Intern::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in intern.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::SpatialHash::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in sphash.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| Data::DisjointSet::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in dsu.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open. |
| The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.0-rc.16 accepts JWT access tokens through the ?token= URL query parameter on every API route (JwtAuthenticator::extractBearerToken fallback). Because tokens are embedded in URLs, they are logged verbatim in web server access logs, leaked via the Referer header, stored in browser history, and captured by upstream proxy and CDN logs, exposing valid admin access tokens. A leaked token grants unauthorized API access, including reading configuration and user data, creating admin accounts, modifying system settings, and deleting pages. |
