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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89836 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix folio_nr_pages() race after put in large folio invalidate Our v6.18 based Android system is continuely suffering livelock and bad page stat as shown in[1] which related to broken xarray slot status. By investigating big folio operations within f2fs, we find below races and fix it by get the nr_pages before drop the refcount and folio_lock. f2fs_get_read_data_folio() calls f2fs_folio_put() before folio_nr_pages() when invalidating a large folio from the page cache. That unlocks the folio and drops the caller reference, leaving a window where a concurrent truncate or folio split can shrink the compound folio or free it before the invalidate range is computed. An undersized range then leaves split sub-folios in mapping->i_pages, which can later interact badly with truncate and reclaim (stale xarray entries and bad page state when folio->mapping no longer matches the mapping being truncated). [1] PID: 2594 TASK: ffffff8169b81580 CPU: 7 COMMAND: "Thread-3" #0 [ffffffc08ef2b8a0] xas_load at ffffffe52d1f42a4 #1 [ffffffc08ef2b900] find_get_entries at ffffffe52c185798 #2 [ffffffc08ef2bb60] truncate_inode_pages_range at ffffffe52c19e83c #3 [ffffffc08ef2bbc0] truncate_inode_pages_final at ffffffe52c19ec2c #4 [ffffffc08ef2bc20] f2fs_evict_inode at ffffffe52c4c8400 #5 [ffffffc08ef2bcc0] evict at ffffffe52c2de9f4 #6 [ffffffc08ef2bd00] iput at ffffffe52c2db1b4 #7 [ffffffc08ef2bd30] dentry_unlink_inode at ffffffe52c2d7204 #8 [ffffffc08ef2bd50] __dentry_kill at ffffffe52c2d3dcc #9 [ffffffc08ef2bd80] dput at ffffffe52c2d3c3c #10 [ffffffc08ef2bda0] __fput at ffffffe52c2b0a7c #11 [ffffffc08ef2bde0] ____fput at ffffffe52c2b1034 #12 [ffffffc08ef2bdf0] task_work_run at ffffffe52beea200 #13 [ffffffc08ef2be20] exit_to_user_mode_loop at ffffffe52bfbc17c #14 [ffffffc08ef2be80] el0_svc at ffffffe52d1f8e54 #15 [ffffffc08ef2beb0] el0t_64_sync_handler at ffffffe52d1f8d10 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89832 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to clear dirty flag on folio in error path If node block is corrupted due to chksum mismatch or inconsistent footer info, it needs to drop clear flag of node folio, in order to persist inconsistent node data to storage. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89829 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to pass folio->index to f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer() Otherwise in f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer(), it will check the same nid incorrectly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89826 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: harden firmware build-info bounds checks panthor_fw_read_build_info() checks whether the metadata range fits in the firmware image with hdr.meta_start + hdr.meta_size. Both fields are u32, so the addition can wrap and let an out-of-bounds range pass validation. The function also reads the "git_sha: " prefix without first checking that the metadata is long enough, and meta_size == 0 can underflow the NULL terminator index. Use subtraction-based bounds checking and reject metadata that is too short to contain the expected prefix and trailing NULL byte. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89825 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: fix firmware control interface bounds checks panthor_init_cs_iface() and panthor_init_csg_iface() validate firmware control interface offsets with 32-bit arithmetic and the size of the host wrapper structures. The offsets are derived from firmware-provided strides, so the arithmetic can wrap before the bounds check, and the host wrapper size is not the size of the firmware control interface being mapped. Use 64-bit arithmetic for the computed offsets and validate against the actual firmware control interface structure sizes with subtraction-based bounds checks. Also validate that the shared section is large enough for the global control interface before using it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89823 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: fix race between partial drm_dev_register() failure and ioctl If drm_dev_register() fails after registering a minor (e.g. render minor registered, primary minor fails), userspace could have opened the first minor and entered a drm_dev_enter() critical section. Since the unplugged flag was never set, the ioctl proceeds while the error path tears down device resources. Fix this by introducing drm_dev_synchronize_unplug(), which sets the unplugged flag and waits for the SRCU barrier, ensuring all in-flight drm_dev_enter() critical sections complete before cleanup proceeds; call it on the error path of drm_dev_register(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89819 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into __set_input_tf() -> __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size. A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces). The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89818 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn: fix integer overflow in dec_msg buffer count check If the supplied msg[2] (num_buffers) is 0x3FFFFFFF, the expression 6 + num_buffers * 4 wraps to 2 and the bounds check passes, letting the parser loop far past the end of the message BO. Triggering it additionally requires a ~4GiB mapping so that msg[1] survives the earlier "header does not fit in BO" check. Rewrite the test in division form, which is overflow-free by construction. Also update the message to reflect that msg is invalid. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89815 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: Drop tt->restore after successful restore ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() can successfully complete the restore process via ttm_pool_restore_commit(), but tt->restore is not dropped afterward. As a result, subsequent backup/restore flows observe what appears to be a completed restore, while in reality shmem handles are still installed in tt->pages, leading to the stack trace below. Fix this by freeing and dropping tt->restore in ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() upon successful completion of the restore. 20545 [ 309.784531] RIP: 0010:sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages+0x38c/0x490 20547 [ 309.809570] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000623b838 EFLAGS: 00010206 20548 [ 309.814827] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff88816e42a160 RCX: 0000000000000000 20549 [ 309.821986] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000001000 20550 [ 309.829147] RBP: ffff88816e42a168 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000007ffff000 20551 [ 309.836310] R10: ffffc9000623b928 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000007ffff000 20552 [ 309.843471] R13: ffff88815ba5a100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 20553 [ 309.850634] FS: 00007f9ff305e700(0000) GS:ffff888276c94000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 20554 [ 309.858749] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 20555 [ 309.864519] CR2: 00007f9fca701000 CR3: 00000001565e2005 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0 20556 [ 309.871678] PKRU: 55555558 20557 [ 309.874403] Call Trace: 20558 [ 309.876866] <TASK> 20559 [ 309.878988] sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment+0x60/0x100 20560 [ 309.884415] ? ttm_resource_manager_usage+0x36/0x60 [ttm] 20561 [ 309.889845] ? xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe] 20562 [ 309.894045] xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe] 20563 [ 309.898037] xe_bo_move+0x927/0xaa0 [xe] 20564 [ 309.902029] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xba/0x170 [ttm] 20565 [ 309.907022] ttm_bo_validate+0xbe/0x190 [ttm] 20566 [ 309.911405] xe_bo_validate+0x9a/0x120 [xe] 20567 [ 309.915663] xe_gpuvm_validate+0xd9/0x140 [xe] 20568 [ 309.920206] drm_gpuvm_validate+0x2f0/0x5b0 [drm_gpuvm] 20569 [ 309.925459] ? drm_exec_lock_obj+0x63/0x210 [drm_exec] 20570 [ 309.930627] xe_vm_validate_rebind+0x46/0xb0 [xe] 20571 [ 309.935428] xe_exec_fn+0x20/0x40 [xe] 20572 [ 309.939249] drm_gpuvm_exec_lock+0x78/0xc0 [drm_gpuvm] 20573 [ 309.944410] xe_validation_exec_lock+0x5a/0xa0 [xe] 20574 [ 309.949385] xe_exec_ioctl+0x806/0xc30 [xe] 20575 [ 309.953639] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xd9/0xf0 20576 [ 309.957935] ? __pfx_xe_exec_fn+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20577 [ 309.962449] ? __wake_up_common+0x73/0xa0 20578 [ 309.966482] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20579 [ 309.971263] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa3/0x100 20580 [ 309.975209] drm_ioctl+0x213/0x440 20581 [ 309.978637] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20582 [ 309.983415] xe_drm_ioctl+0x67/0xd0 [xe] 20583 [ 309.987408] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89814 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: clamp the isolation index for rings outside a partition adev->isolation[] has one slot per partition, but a ring that is not assigned to one keeps AMDGPU_XCP_NO_PARTITION, which is ~0, so indexing the array with it is out of bounds. SDMA submissions hit this on both the isolation enforcement and the VM flush path and trip UBSAN. Fall back to the first slot the way the cleaner shader path already does, and stop taking the address before the ring type check that makes it relevant. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89811 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Add TLB flush after MES queue eviction/suspension MES (Micro Engine Scheduler) does not perform heavy-weight TLB invalidation after unmapping queues, unlike HWS which does this automatically. This causes a race condition where in-flight DMA descriptors can access memory that has been unmapped, leading to page faults and GPU queue hangs during SVM page migration. The issue manifests as KFDSVMRangeTest.MultiThreadMigrationTest failures on gfx1151 (Strix Point) with XNACK mode 1 enabled - the GPU compute queue hangs with packets submitted but never consumed. Add kfd_flush_tlb() calls after MES queue removal in two locations: - evict_process_queues_cpsch(): after all queues removed during eviction - suspend_queues(): after debug/criu queue suspension (with mem_fence barrier) This ensures all in-flight memory accesses from unmapped queues are flushed before memory is freed or migrated. (cherry picked from commit f5c4f88e0f9c45a8fb9dfac0c1df726c95e41b77) | ||||
| CVE-2026-89810 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix error path at svm_migrate_copy_to_ram If page migration from device to sys ram fails for some reasons driver needs release and unlock allocated system pages. To do that driver should use page physical address, or pfn, then get struct page*. Current driver uses dma address(for adev) that is not correct with IOMMU enabled, or even in general. The patch releases and unlocks allocated system pages based on where migration failed by struct page* of sys ram pages. Also dma_unmap correspodent system ram pages at error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89808 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix the case that vm range is hole at svm_migrate_copy_to_vram When migration vm range is hole at cpu side(MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE set + MIGRATE_PFN_VALID unset) driver still allocates device pages. There is no dma map of src pages and migration. j is 0 and svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart() will return an uninitialized r. That can trigger out_free_vram_pages to drop all VRAM just set up. Initialize r and only call the last svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart if j > 0. Current code postponed the last page to the final copy. This patch flushes on the last page when reach to the end of current drm_buddy_block; avoids another svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89806 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sysfb: ofdrm: Fix integer overflow in fb_size calculation The framebuffer size calculation `fb_size = linebytes * height` can overflow when both values are large (e.g., 46341 * 46341 > INT_MAX). Since linebytes and height are both int types, the multiplication is performed as int * int, which results in undefined behavior on overflow. Use check_mul_overflow() to detect and prevent this overflow, consistent with the approach used in simpledrm.c and corebootdrm.c. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89805 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/pagemap: Fix folio allocation fallback and use-after-put drm_pagemap_migrate_populate_ram_pfn() had two issues when populating RAM PFNs with higher-order folios: 1. The higher-order vma_alloc_folio()/folio_alloc() calls did not pass __GFP_NOWARN, so a THP allocation failure under memory pressure would spam the kernel log, and there was no fallback path despite a TODO comment stating one was needed. Add __GFP_NOWARN to the higher-order allocation and, on failure, fall back to order-0 allocations for the entire range originally covered by the failed higher-order allocation, leaving MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND unset for those PFNs. 2. In the free_pages error path, order was computed via folio_order(page_folio(page)) *after* put_page(page) had already dropped the reference, resulting in a use-after-free/put when that was the last reference on the page. Compute order before releasing the page. Introducing the fallback in 1. also requires the source page array handed to ->copy_to_ram() to be built differently. Both callers only populated the entry at the head of each source folio, relying on the copy callback to derive the rest of the folio from the order recorded in the matching drm_pagemap_addr. Once the destination has been demoted to order-0 folios the drm_pagemap_addr entries are per-page, so a source page is needed for every one of them; leaving them NULL makes the copy callback stop after the first page and the remainder of the range is never copied. The source folio is only split later, by migrate_vma_pages() / migrate_device_pages(), so its order cannot be used to detect the demotion - test the destination for MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND instead. Factor the array population out into drm_pagemap_migrate_populate_src_pages() and use it from both drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram() and __drm_pagemap_migrate_to_ram(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89804 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/dmem: fix mismatched DMA unmap size for large folios Device-private THP migration maps migration buffers with page_size() and records that length in dma_info->size. For a compound folio page_size() is PAGE_SIZE << order, but two teardown sites still pass a literal PAGE_SIZE to dma_unmap_page(): - nouveau_dmem_migrate_to_ram() on the success path, and - nouveau_dmem_migrate_copy_one() on the copy-error path. For an order > 0 folio this unmaps less than was mapped, leaking the remainder of the IOMMU/IOVA mapping. The other unmap sites, in nouveau_dmem_migrate_chunk() and nouveau_dmem_evict_chunk(), already use the saved size; use it here too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89803 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: unsubscribe the channel-kill event before the fence context nouveau_channel_del() tears the fence context down first and only drops the channel-kill subscription later, in the middle of the nvif object teardown: if (chan->fence) nouveau_fence(chan->cli->drm)->context_del(chan); ... nvif_object_dtor(&chan->vram); nvif_event_dtor(&chan->kill); The subscribed handler is nouveau_channel_killed(), which calls nouveau_channel_kill() and from there nouveau_fence_context_kill() on chan->fence. A kill event delivered in that window takes fctx->lock and walks fctx->pending on a fence context that context_del() has already freed. Nothing reaches this below Fermi today, because the subscription is gated on FERMI_CHANNEL_GPFIFO and nothing kills a channel there. On Fermi and newer the window is real but narrow, since a kill has to land exactly while the channel is being destroyed. That is reason enough on its own, which is why this carries a Fixes: tag. The last patch in this series subscribes Tesla channels as well; nothing kills those today, so it does not widen the exposure now, but it is the groundwork for a recovery path that would, and the ordering is better fixed before that lands than alongside it. Drop the subscription before anything it depends on is torn down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89801 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/uvmm: fix premature region free on failed OP_UNMAP_SPARSE In nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_submit()'s OP_UNMAP_SPARSE arm, op->reg is set from nouveau_uvma_region_find(), which only looks the region up and takes no reference; a region's sole reference is its membership in uvmm->region_mt. Two failure paths leave op->reg set: the -ENOENT check when the region is busy, and the drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() failure. The sibling nouveau_uvmm_sm_unmap_prepare() failure just below clears op->reg; these two do not. unwind_continue steps back one op, so the failing op is skipped by the unwind loop and its op->reg stays set. nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup() then enters its if (op->reg) branch and calls nouveau_uvma_region_remove() and nouveau_uvma_region_put() on it, dropping the tree's sole reference and freeing a region this job never created. The comment above the cleanup loop documents the broken invariant: op->reg must be NULL on submit failure. This frees a live region on an unrelated failure, reachable single-job when drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() returns -ENOMEM; if another job owns the same region, its cleanup then removes and puts the freed region, a use-after-free. Clear op->reg on both failure paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89799 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable preemption in bpf_get_stackid The get_perf_callchain call needs disabled preemption plus we need it disabled as long as we access its returned trace entries buffer. Note the bpf_get_stackid_pe function is executed already with preemption disabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89795 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: Allow per function PCI slots to fix slot reset on s390 On s390 systems, which use a machine level hypervisor, PCI devices are always accessed through a form of PCI pass-through which fundamentally operates on a per PCI function granularity. This is also reflected in the s390 PCI hotplug driver which creates hotplug slots for individual PCI functions. Its reset_slot() function, which is a wrapper for zpci_hot_reset_device(), thus also resets individual functions. Currently, the pci_create_slot() assigns the same pci_slot object to multifunction devices. This approach worked fine on s390 systems that only exposed virtual functions as individual PCI domains to the operating system. Since commit 44510d6fa0c0 ("s390/pci: Handling multifunctions") s390 supports exposing the topology of multifunction PCI devices by grouping them in a shared PCI domain. This creates a problem when resetting a function through the hotplug driver's slot_reset() interface. When attempting to reset a function through the hotplug driver, the shared slot assignment causes the wrong function to be reset instead of the intended one. It also leaks memory as we do create a pci_slot object for the function, but don't correctly free it in pci_slot_release(). Add a flag for struct pci_slot to allow per function PCI slots for functions managed through a hypervisor, which exposes individual PCI functions while retaining the topology. Since we can use all 8 bits for slot 'number' (for ARI devices), change slot 'number' u16 to account for special values PCI_SLOT_PLACEHOLDER and PCI_SLOT_ALL_DEVICES. | ||||