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Search Results (26122 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-88260 | 1 Brainzcompany | 1 Zenius Ems 8.0 | 2026-09-13 | N/A |
| Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel and Improper validation of syntactic correctness of input vulnerability in Brainzcompany Zenius EMS 8.0 allows Remote Code Inclusion. This issue affects Zenius EMS 8.0: through OAM (Build 109). | ||||
| CVE-2026-78546 | 1 Citirx | 1 Workspace App For Windows | 2026-09-13 | N/A |
| Out-of-bounds read vulnerability in Citirx Workspace app for Windows. This issue affects Workspace app for Windows: before 2603.11 Current Release (CR), before 2507.1 LTSR CU3, and before LTSR 2607. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88284 | 1 Geovision Inc. | 2 Gv-lpc2011 Lpc2211, Gv-lpc2011 Lpc2211 - | 2026-09-13 | 4.9 Medium |
| GeoVision GV-LPC2211 V1.13 fails to limit repeated User elements in ONVIF SetUser requests, allowing an authenticated administrator to overwrite stack control state and crash the ONVIF worker. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90775 | 1 Postgis | 1 Address Standardizer | 2026-09-13 | 6.5 Medium |
| PostGIS address_standardizer through 3.7.0 fails to validate the Weight parameter from caller-supplied rules tables before using it as an array index. Attackers can craft malicious rule rows with out-of-range Weight values to trigger out-of-bounds reads in the load_value array, causing the PostgreSQL backend process to crash and terminate all cluster sessions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80087 | 1 Microsoft | 11 365, 365 Apps, Microsoft 365 and 8 more | 2026-09-13 | 6.5 Medium |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80088 | 1 Microsoft | 17 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft 365 Apps For Enterprise and 14 more | 2026-09-13 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89743 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89731 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/ras: Fix cxl_rch_get_aer_info() out-of-bounds AER register read cxl_rch_get_aer_info() copies the RCH Downstream Port AER capability from the RCRB MMIO block using a readl() loop bounded by sizeof(struct aer_capability_regs). This struct is a software layout and its embedded struct pcie_tlp_log is larger than the on-wire AER capability. As a result the loop reads past the mapped AER register block. The over-read also populates the software-only tail fields including header_log.header_len. An out-of-range header_len passed to pcie_print_tlp_log() can then loop past the header log buffer and cause a second out-of-bounds read. The read was correct when introduced, but struct pcie_tlp_log has since grown (Header Log and TLP Prefix Log sizes, header_len and flit fields), so sizeof(struct aer_capability_regs) no longer matches the physical AER capability. Bound the read to the physical AER registers, header through the 16 byte Header Log. Zero the destination first so the software-only fields are deterministic. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89705 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: restore rq_status_counter to even on all nfsd_dispatch() exit paths nfsd_dispatch() sets rq_status_counter to an odd value once a request has been decoded, and back to an even value once it has been fully processed, forming a seq-lock like protocol with the lockless reader in nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit(). Only the fully successful path restored the counter to even. The cache-hit (RC_REPLY), drop (RC_DROPIT / RQ_DROPME) and encode-error paths all return after the odd-valued store without ever bringing the counter back to even. Once one of those paths is taken, rq_status_counter is left odd: the next request's decode ORs in 1 (still odd) and only a subsequent successful encode restores even. While stuck odd, the dumpit reader treats the rqstp fields as stable and its retry check compares against the same unchanging odd value, so it never detects concurrent mutation. This exposes actively mutating fields (e.g. args->ops / args->opcnt during compound decode and release) to the lockless reader, which can read past the end of the 8-element inline ops array. Add a helper that advances the counter to the next even value and call it on every return path that follows the odd-valued store. The decode-error path is left untouched as it is reached before the counter is set odd. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89691 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: clear opcnt on compound arg release to prevent OOB read nfsd4_release_compoundargs() resets args->ops to the inline iops[8] array when the dynamically-allocated ops buffer is freed, but leaves args->opcnt at its original value (which can be up to 200 for NFSv4.1+ compounds). If rq_status_counter is stuck at an odd value (which can happen when nfsd_dispatch() hits an error path after setting it odd), the RPC status dumpit handler reads min(opcnt, 16) entries from args->ops[]. Since iops only has 8 elements and is the last field in struct nfsd4_compoundargs, reading indices 8-15 accesses adjacent slab memory and leaks it to userspace via netlink. Zero opcnt unconditionally in nfsd4_release_compoundargs() so stale compound metadata is never exposed through the status interface. [ cel: Remove the kvfree_rcu_mightsleep() sleep from the exposure window ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89651 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session() handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a 32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the _safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer. The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() -> kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session(). Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the client (out-of-bounds read). Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89633 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89632 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf). Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89631 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject a tree connect response whose byte count is too small CIFSTCon() bounds its strnlen() over the byte area with the server's ByteCount minus two, which for ByteCount 0 or 1 goes negative as an int and converts to a huge size_t. The later subtraction wraps the __u16 bytes_left, and that is what bounds cifs_strndup_from_utf16(): a bound of up to 65535 against a ~16 KB cifs_req_poolp object runs off the end of the slab object, and the bytes reach userspace through tcon->nativeFileSystem in /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData. Reject a byte area too small for what the parser consumes. Two bytes is the least it can consume, and no conformant response carries fewer. The new trace point is the 129th smb_eio_trace entry, which __mode(byte) cannot represent, so the attribute goes with it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89630 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break() Commit 83bfbd0bb902 ("cifs: Remove the RFC1002 header from smb_hdr") changed the quantity this bound is measured against. It used to be srv->total_read minus the 4-byte RFC1002 preamble that total_read then included, so it was the SMB message length. The same commit stopped counting the preamble, and the mechanical substitution to srv->total_read - srv->pdu_size left an expression that is identically zero: standard_receive3() reads MID_HEADER_SIZE() bytes and then exactly pdu_length - MID_HEADER_SIZE() more, adding both to total_read. len is therefore 0, the subtraction below it wraps, and no __u32 DataOffset can exceed the result, so the check from commit 097f5863b1a0 ("cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break()") no longer rejects anything. Use total_read, which is now the message length on its own. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89620 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer: memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len); The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with attacker-controlled length and content. Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix. write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well. That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89619 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: bound GET_REPORT response to the caller buffer quickspi_hid_raw_request() receives the caller's buffer length in len, but quickspi_get_report() never sees it and copies the whole device-supplied response into buf regardless: memcpy(buf, qsdev->report_buf, qsdev->report_len); qsdev->report_len comes from the input report the touch controller returns, while buf is sized to whatever the caller asked hidraw for through HIDIOCGFEATURE or HIDIOCGINPUT. A response larger than that overflows buf with device-controlled content. The intel-quicki2c sibling already passes the caller length down to quicki2c_get_report() and validates the response against it before the copy. Do the same here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89614 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound the free-cluster bitmap scan to the volume vol->lcn_empty_bits_per_page is sized from vol->nr_clusters at mount, but ntfs_cluster_alloc() bounds its scan of that array by the size of $Bitmap. Those are independent on-disk quantities and the mount-time check only rejects a $Bitmap that is too small, so an image whose $Bitmap covers more clusters than the volume has lets the scan index past the array. A run whose LCN lies in that gap takes the allocator straight there, since the caller passes the file's own last LCN as its locality hint. KASAN reports a slab out-of-bounds read when a file on such a volume is extended. Clamp the scan to what that array covers, mirroring the max_index calculation the mount-time scan already uses, and reject a decoded LCN at or beyond nr_clusters in the mapping pairs decoder. Conforming volumes are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: APEI: GHES: fix ARM section length accounting after header In ghes_handle_arm_hw_error(), after skipping the cper_sec_proc_arm header with (err + 1), the remaining length was reduced by sizeof(err) (pointer size) instead of sizeof(*err) (structure size). That overestimates the bytes left for cper_arm_err_info records and can let the parser read past the CPER section when err_info_num is large enough relative to error_data_length. Use sizeof(*err) so the length accounting matches the pointer advance and the earlier sizeof(*err) size check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: validate user space vectors during extraction The bio-based drivers don't necessarily check the alignment split, and stacking block drivers don't always handle a misalignment detected after submitting the bio. Validate user vectors against the device's dma_alignment as the bio is built from the iov_iter, rejecting misaligned early with -EINVAL. | ||||