Export limit exceeded: 370509 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (370509 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64459 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: restore RCU grace period in tcp_ao_destroy_sock Commit 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU") removed the call_rcu() callback from tcp_ao_destroy_sock(), arguing that "the destruction of info/keys is delayed until the socket destructor" and therefore "no one can discover it anymore". That argument does not hold for the call site in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4327-4332). At that point the socket is in TCP_SYN_SENT, has already been inserted into the inet ehash by inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect(), and is therefore very much discoverable: any softirq running tcp_v4_rcv() on another CPU can take the socket out of the ehash, walk into tcp_inbound_hash(), and load tp->ao_info via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken on the destroying CPU. The reader path then enters __tcp_ao_do_lookup() (net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c:208) which re-loads tp->ao_info via rcu_dereference_check(); the re-load can still observe the (about-to-be-freed) pointer because there is no synchronize_rcu() between rcu_assign_pointer(tp->ao_info, NULL) and tcp_ao_info_free() in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(). The captured pointer is then walked at line 223: hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &ao->head, node, ...) The writer's synchronous kfree() is free to complete between the line 218 re-fetch and the line 223 hlist iteration. The slab is reused (or simply LIST_POISON1-stamped if not yet reused) and the iteration walks attacker-controlled or poison memory in softirq context. Reproducer (no debug shim, stock x86_64 v7.1-rc2 SMP+KASAN, QEMU+KVM): an unprivileged uid=1000 process inside CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET installs TCP_MD5SIG + TCP_AO_ADD_KEY on a TCP socket, sprays forged TCP-AO segments toward its eventual 4-tuple via raw sockets, then calls connect(). The md5-wins reconciliation in tcp_connect() fires tcp_ao_destroy_sock(); the softirq backlog reader on the loopback NAPI path crashes on the freed ao->head.first walk: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c000000002f KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000178-0xdead00000000017f] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 100 Comm: repro_userns RIP: 0010:__tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 tcp_ao_inbound_lookup.constprop.0+0x12a/0x200 tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x5ea/0x1520 tcp_inbound_hash+0x7ce/0x1240 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1e7a/0x3e10 ... Restore the RCU grace period: re-add struct rcu_head to tcp_ao_info and replace the synchronous tcp_ao_info_free() with a call_rcu() callback. Readers that captured tp->ao_info before rcu_assign_pointer NULLed it now see the object remain valid until rcu_read_unlock(). With the patch applied the reproducer runs cleanly for 2000 iterations on the same kernel build. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64456 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64452 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error path drops the lock before printing nhc->name. lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive path. This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path, another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name for the warning. With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220 Read of size 8 lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression lowpan_header_decompress Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64450 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64449 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 | ||||
| CVE-2026-64448 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]"). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet smb2_check_message() still accepts it. The subsequent decoder then reads past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30 SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90 cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 85: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G B 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680 SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0 SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0 cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 93: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for. When a data area is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length overruns the ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-64447 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the device's reference count drops to zero. Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown has already freed it: 1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free. 2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit() internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free. Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed manually. Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(), causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead. Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in the return values of the two affected error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64445 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64441 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr() Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks. rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie() compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least 6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain. rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer. Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64440 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64439 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL completion callback and treat any negative return from crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the worker dereferences the freed slab on completion. KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend bound to krb5->encrypt_name: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7 The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing crypto_wait_req() through every call site. Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to the krb5 enctype name. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64437 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too: SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock() worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock pointing at the freed file_lock. A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block __locks_delete_block locks_delete_block ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock smb2_remove_blocked_lock smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn handle_ksmbd_work Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit) ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192 Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger. Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE so any non-active work is skipped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64435 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE() protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races. All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites: - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment) - audit_receive() backlog check - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn() KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57: skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0 kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220 kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430 kthread+0x1c2/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1: audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0 audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0 do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260 get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0 value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(), which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() write accesses already present on the writer side. [PM: line length tweak] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64432 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table (DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount time: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past the allocated page_lcns[] array: 1. dp->lcns_follow (capacity) can be smaller than lrh->lcns_follow. 2. lrh->target_vcn may be smaller than dp->vcn, making the u64 subtraction wrap to a huge size_t. Validate target VCN delta and per-record LCN count against the DPT entry capacity, bail via the existing out: cleanup label with -EINVAL. This mirrors the bounds-check pattern added in commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") and commit 0ca0485e4b2e ("fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64431 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write() returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write. However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller, ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway. Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with: - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access KASAN reports describing the memory corruption: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write(). The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning. If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on bad index_block. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64430 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats: BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001 ... Call trace: ... schedule+0x38/0x110 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30 mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60 msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138 pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60 ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8 handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100 handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8 ... Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64423 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-64420 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-64418 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-27 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: shrinker: fix shrinker_info teardown race with expansion expand_shrinker_info() iterates all visible memcgs under shrinker_mutex, including memcgs that have not finished ->css_online() yet. Once pn->shrinker_info has been published, teardown must stay serialized with expand_shrinker_info() until that memcg is either fully online or no longer visible to iteration. Today alloc_shrinker_info() breaks that rule by dropping shrinker_mutex before freeing a partially initialized shrinker_info array, which may cause the following race: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== css_create --> list_add_tail_rcu(&css->sibling, &parent_css->children); online_css --> mem_cgroup_css_online --> alloc_shrinker_info --> alloc node0 info rcu_assign_pointer(C->node0->shrinker_info, old0) alloc node1 info -> FAIL -> goto err mutex_unlock(shrinker_mutex) shrinker_alloc() --> shrinker_memcg_alloc --> mutex_lock(shrinker_mutex) expand_shrinker_info --> mem_cgroup_iter see the memcg expand_one_shrinker_info --> old0 = C->node0->shrinker_info memcpy(new->unit, old0->unit, ...); free_shrinker_info --> kvfree(old0); /* double free !! */ kvfree_rcu(old0, rcu); The same problem exists later in mem_cgroup_css_online(). If alloc_shrinker_info() succeeds but a subsequent objcg allocation fails, the free_objcg -> free_shrinker_info() unwind path tears down the already published pn->shrinker_info arrays without shrinker_mutex. The expand_one_shrinker_info() can race with that teardown in the same way, leading to use-after-free or double-free of the old shrinker_info. Fix this by serializing shrinker_info teardown with shrinker_mutex, and by keeping alloc_shrinker_info() error cleanup inside the locked section. | ||||