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Sat, 08 Aug 2026 03:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
Fri, 07 Aug 2026 01:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Contiki-ng
Contiki-ng contiki-ng |
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| Vendors & Products |
Contiki-ng
Contiki-ng contiki-ng |
Thu, 06 Aug 2026 22:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Contiki-NG's MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG's MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection. | |
| Title | Contiki-NG MQTT Client Out-of-Bounds Write in PUBLISH Topic Parser via Persistent State Between TCP Segments | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-787 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: VulnCheck
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-08T02:28:04.156Z
Reserved: 2026-04-08T19:29:27.852Z
Link: CVE-2026-5857
Updated: 2026-08-08T02:27:58.323Z
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-07T01:15:04Z