The shell tool command allowlist in the SecurityPolicy of OpenHuman desktop agent through 0.54.0 (default Supervised security policy) can be bypassed to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the desktop user. Two flaws in src/openhuman/security/policy.rs combine: (1) is_args_safe() blocks the find flags -exec and -ok but not the functionally identical -execdir and -okdir, which also execute an arbitrary command for each matched file; and (2) skip_env_assignments() strips leading inline KEY=value environment-variable assignments before allowlist validation, so a command such as GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=<cmd> git diff is validated as the allowed git diff but, when executed via the shell, runs <cmd> through git's environment-driven hooks (for example GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF or GIT_SSH_COMMAND). Because the sandbox is the primary trust boundary between untrusted LLM-processed content and the host operating system, an attacker can achieve remote code execution via indirect prompt injection: a malicious document, email, calendar event, or web page ingested by the agent instructs it to run a benign-looking allowlisted command, resulting in arbitrary command execution, data exfiltration, arbitrary file read/write, and lateral movement on the user's machine. The issue was fixed in commit 60050aa09a870f53ed7e4cd40ed41fd2860329e7 (first released in 0.54.22-staging; first stable release 0.56.0), which blocks -execdir/-okdir for find.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tinyhumansai | OpenHuman | unaffected |
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Thu, 18 Jun 2026 04:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The shell tool command allowlist in the SecurityPolicy of OpenHuman desktop agent through 0.54.0 (default Supervised security policy) can be bypassed to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the desktop user. Two flaws in src/openhuman/security/policy.rs combine: (1) is_args_safe() blocks the find flags -exec and -ok but not the functionally identical -execdir and -okdir, which also execute an arbitrary command for each matched file; and (2) skip_env_assignments() strips leading inline KEY=value environment-variable assignments before allowlist validation, so a command such as GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=<cmd> git diff is validated as the allowed git diff but, when executed via the shell, runs <cmd> through git's environment-driven hooks (for example GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF or GIT_SSH_COMMAND). Because the sandbox is the primary trust boundary between untrusted LLM-processed content and the host operating system, an attacker can achieve remote code execution via indirect prompt injection: a malicious document, email, calendar event, or web page ingested by the agent instructs it to run a benign-looking allowlisted command, resulting in arbitrary command execution, data exfiltration, arbitrary file read/write, and lateral movement on the user's machine. The issue was fixed in commit 60050aa09a870f53ed7e4cd40ed41fd2860329e7 (first released in 0.54.22-staging; first stable release 0.56.0), which blocks -execdir/-okdir for find. | |
| Title | OpenHuman desktop agent shell tool sandbox bypass leads to arbitrary command execution | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-184 CWE-78 |
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cvssV3_1
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: TuranSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-17T15:40:47.796Z
Reserved: 2026-06-17T12:59:17.621Z
Link: CVE-2026-55743
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