Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part headers by interpolating the caller-supplied name, filename, and content_type values directly into the content-disposition and content-type lines with no escaping or CRLF stripping. A value containing ", \r, or \n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and prepends a smuggled part of the attacker's choosing.
This is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is particularly easy when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. Any application that forwards user-controlled filenames (or field names / MIME types) through Req.post/2 with form_multipart: lets an attacker inject arbitrary headers into the outgoing multipart body or smuggle additional fields and parts into the request the victim service sends downstream.
This issue affects req: from 0.5.3 before 0.6.0.
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
Sanitize attacker-influenced name, filename, and content_type values before passing them to Req.post/2 with form_multipart:. At minimum, reject (or strip) any value containing \r, \n, or ". When forwarding uploads, derive filename from a normalised string rather than Path.basename/1 on a user-controlled path.
Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:45:00 +0000
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| Description | Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows multipart parameter smuggling via attacker-influenced part metadata. Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part headers by interpolating the caller-supplied name, filename, and content_type values directly into the content-disposition and content-type lines with no escaping or CRLF stripping. A value containing ", \r, or \n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and prepends a smuggled part of the attacker's choosing. This is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is particularly easy when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. Any application that forwards user-controlled filenames (or field names / MIME types) through Req.post/2 with form_multipart: lets an attacker inject arbitrary headers into the outgoing multipart body or smuggle additional fields and parts into the request the victim service sends downstream. This issue affects req: from 0.5.3 before 0.6.0. | |
| Title | Multipart form-data header injection in Req via unescaped name/filename/content_type | |
| First Time appeared |
Wojtekmach
Wojtekmach req |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-93 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:wojtekmach:req:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Wojtekmach
Wojtekmach req |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-08T16:34:58.505Z
Reserved: 2026-06-01T13:45:22.448Z
Link: CVE-2026-49756
Updated: 2026-06-08T16:05:28.978Z
Status : Received
Published: 2026-06-08T16:16:44.040
Modified: 2026-06-08T16:16:44.040
Link: CVE-2026-49756
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.