Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows multipart parameter smuggling via attacker-influenced part metadata.

Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part headers by interpolating the caller-supplied name, filename, and content_type values directly into the content-disposition and content-type lines with no escaping or CRLF stripping. A value containing ", \r, or \n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and prepends a smuggled part of the attacker's choosing.

This is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is particularly easy when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. Any application that forwards user-controlled filenames (or field names / MIME types) through Req.post/2 with form_multipart: lets an attacker inject arbitrary headers into the outgoing multipart body or smuggle additional fields and parts into the request the victim service sends downstream.

This issue affects req: from 0.5.3 before 0.6.0.

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Fixes

Solution

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Workaround

Sanitize attacker-influenced name, filename, and content_type values before passing them to Req.post/2 with form_multipart:. At minimum, reject (or strip) any value containing \r, \n, or ". When forwarding uploads, derive filename from a normalised string rather than Path.basename/1 on a user-controlled path.

History

Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows multipart parameter smuggling via attacker-influenced part metadata. Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part headers by interpolating the caller-supplied name, filename, and content_type values directly into the content-disposition and content-type lines with no escaping or CRLF stripping. A value containing ", \r, or \n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and prepends a smuggled part of the attacker's choosing. This is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is particularly easy when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. Any application that forwards user-controlled filenames (or field names / MIME types) through Req.post/2 with form_multipart: lets an attacker inject arbitrary headers into the outgoing multipart body or smuggle additional fields and parts into the request the victim service sends downstream. This issue affects req: from 0.5.3 before 0.6.0.
Title Multipart form-data header injection in Req via unescaped name/filename/content_type
First Time appeared Wojtekmach
Wojtekmach req
Weaknesses CWE-93
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:wojtekmach:req:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Wojtekmach
Wojtekmach req
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-08T16:34:58.505Z

Reserved: 2026-06-01T13:45:22.448Z

Link: CVE-2026-49756

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-08T16:05:28.978Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-06-08T16:16:44.040

Modified: 2026-06-08T16:16:44.040

Link: CVE-2026-49756

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses