| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the "LogServer" field of the syslog component in Zyxel AX7501-B1 firmware versions through 5.17(ABPC.7.2)C0 could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute OS commands on an affected device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as
kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses,
passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether
the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.
chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long
as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and
the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters
can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256
(digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5
(digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.
The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.
The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length
up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing
base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length
exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.
Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and
unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=',
so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.
The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is
kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1
base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size,
DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than
CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is
added at the call site to document this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: validate body pcifunc in rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify
rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() in drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/
octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c queues a sender-controlled REP_EVENT_NOTIFY
request body verbatim, and rvu_rep_up_notify() then forwards
event->pcifunc (the nested body field, distinct from the
AF-normalised header pcifunc) into rvu_get_pfvf(), rvu_get_pf() and
the AF->PF mailbox device index without any bounds check.
A VF attached to a PF that has been put into switchdev
representor mode reaches this path: the VF mailbox handler
otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() forwards every message id including
MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_NOTIFY to AF without an allowlist, and the AF
dispatcher rewrites only msg->pcifunc, leaving struct
rep_event::pcifunc attacker-controlled. The sibling
rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg() refuses requests whose header pcifunc
is not rvu->rep_pcifunc; this handler has no equivalent gate.
An out-of-range body pcifunc selects an &rvu->pf[]/&rvu->hwvf[]
element past the allocated array and, for RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE,
turns into a six-byte attacker-chosen OOB ether_addr_copy() target
inside the queued worker; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds write
in rvu_rep_wq_handler.
Reject malformed requests at the handler entry by gating on
is_pf_func_valid(), which is already the canonical PF/VF range check
in this driver; expose it via rvu.h so callers in rvu_rep.c can use
it instead of open-coding the same range arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: wcove: don't write past struct pd_message in wcove_read_rx_buffer()
wcove_read_rx_buffer() copies the PD RX FIFO into the caller's
struct pd_message with
for (i = 0; i < USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES(info); i++)
regmap_read(wcove->regmap, USBC_RX_DATA + i, msg + i);
which has two problems:
USBC_RXINFO_RXBYTES() is a 5-bit field (max 31) while struct pd_message
is 30 bytes (__le16 header + __le32 payload[PD_MAX_PAYLOAD], packed).
The byte count latched in RXINFO is the number of bytes the port partner
put on the wire, so a malicious partner that transmits a 31-byte frame
can drive the loop one byte past the destination if the WCOVE BMC
receiver does not enforce the PD object-count limit in hardware. The
existing FIXME flagged this as unverified.
Independently, regmap_read() takes an unsigned int * and stores a full
unsigned int at the destination. Passing the byte pointer msg + i means
each iteration writes four bytes; the high three are zero (val_bits is
8) and are normally overwritten by the next iteration, but the final
iteration's high bytes are not. With RXBYTES == 30 the i == 29 iteration
already writes three zero bytes past msg, which sits on the IRQ thread's
stack in wcove_typec_irq().
Clamp the loop to sizeof(struct pd_message) and read each register into
a local before storing only its low byte, so the copy can never exceed
the destination regardless of what RXINFO reports. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: validate count before reading Status Update VDO
A broken/malicious device can send the incorrect count for a status
update VDO, which will cause the kernel to read uninitialized stack data
and send it off elsewhere.
Fix this up by correctly verifying the count for the update object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once
before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every
point in the loop.
In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of
at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX
modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the
CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming
ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set,
an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken
or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to
ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra
Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,
the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For
mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the
partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen
SVID/VDO bytes.
Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed
past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner
supplies or how the function was reached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler
bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without
an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into
each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is
left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of
stack are pushed to userspace per scan.
This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the
move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing.
bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this
driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a
short-fill issue.
Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM
(fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len,
but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len.
The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has
always enforced both bounds:
if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW.
Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(),
mirroring the ioctl.
Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom()
in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers
to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback()
uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: validate rx_req_idx to prevent out-of-bounds array access
In mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), rx_req_idx is derived from
sge->address in DMA-coherent memory. In Confidential VMs
(SEV-SNP/TDX), this memory is shared unencrypted and HW can modify
WQE contents at any time. No bounds check exists on rx_req_idx,
which can lead to an out-of-bounds access into reqs[].
Add bounds check on rx_req_idx in mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() before
using it to index the reqs[] array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access
css_rstat_updated() is exposed as a BPF kfunc and accepts a
caller-provided cpu argument. The function uses cpu for per-cpu rstat
lookups without checking whether it refers to a valid possible CPU.
A BPF iter/cgroup program with CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON can pass an
invalid cpu value. On an unfixed UBSCAN_BOUNDS test kernel, cpu ==
0x7fffffff triggers:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/cgroup/rstat.c:31:9
index 2147483647 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [64]'
Call Trace:
css_rstat_updated
bpf_iter_run_prog
cgroup_iter_seq_show
bpf_seq_read
Add cpu validation to the BPF-facing css_rstat_updated() kfunc and
move the common implementation to __css_rstat_updated() for in-kernel
callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/statmount: fix slab out-of-bounds write in statmount_mnt_idmap
statmount_mnt_idmap() writes one mapping with seq_printf() and then
manually advances seq->count to include the NUL separator.
If seq_printf() overflows, seq_set_overflow() sets seq->count to
seq->size. The manual seq->count++ changes this to seq->size + 1.
seq_has_overflowed() then no longer detects the overflow. The corrupted
count returns to statmount_string(), which later executes:
seq->buf[seq->count++] = '\0';
This causes a 1-byte NULL out-of-bounds write on the dynamically
allocated seq buffer.
Fix this by checking for overflow immediately after seq_printf(). |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, Pillow's public rank-filter API can trigger a native heap out-of-bounds write when given a very large odd filter size because ImageFilter.RankFilter.filter() calls image.expand(size // 2, size // 2) before rank-filter size validation and ImagingExpand() computes output dimensions with unchecked signed int arithmetic. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.2.0 through 12.2.0, src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c accumulates total_component_width across every tile in a JPEG2000 image instead of recomputing it per tile, allowing a crafted tiled JPEG2000 file to force substantially higher transient memory usage and trigger out-of-memory failures during decoding. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| GPT-SoVITS through 20250606v2pro contains an OS command injection vulnerability in webui.py where ASR, slice, denoise, and uvr5 functions interpolate unsanitized Gradio textbox values directly into shell commands executed with shell=True. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters through path parameters to execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process user without authentication. |
| Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data. Users should upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design. |
| A remote code execution vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. Insufficient bounds validation in the AV1 encoder's SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control allows an attacker to supply crafted video frame pixels that overlap with internal encoder layer context structures. In fork-based video processing services, an attacker can use this to hijack the cyclic refresh map pointer, brute-force the process base address via a crash oracle, and redirect control flow to achieve arbitrary command execution. Exploitation requires the target service to use libaom with SVC encoding enabled and accept attacker-supplied video frames. |
| An arbitrary address write vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows an attacker to inject an arbitrary pointer into the cyclic refresh map field via crafted image pixel values. The encoder then writes approximately 1,200 bytes at the attacker-controlled address. This is fully deterministic and does not require a separate information leak. An attacker who can supply frames to a network-facing libaom encoder with SVC enabled could exploit this for denial of service or potential code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least
eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer
dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size. |
| In Modem, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01267281 / MOLY01318201; Issue ID: MSV-6486. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints
Add the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid
out-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious
device report smaller buffers than expected. |
