| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A denial-of-service and resource exhaustion vulnerability exists within the `GDBus` component of GLib. The `gdbusauth` authentication mechanism fails to enforce proper length limitations on data lines read from a client. An unauthenticated local or remote attacker can exploit this lack of input validation by sending excessively long streams of data, causing the application to consume massive amounts of system memory and CPU, potentially leading to a crash or system hang. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-pci: fix dma_vecs leak on p2p memory
We don't unmap P2P memory, so we don't need to track it. The dma_vec
allocation was getting leaked on the completion. |
| dd-trace is the Datadog APM client for Node.js. Prior to 5.100.0, W3C baggage propagation in packages/dd-trace/src/baggage.js and packages/dd-trace/src/opentracing/propagation/text_map.js parsed incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES on extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs, or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against any HTTP service with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 5.100.0. |
| Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the screenshot/print proxy (/proxy?data=…) maintains a package-level assets map[string]MessageAssets cache, but reads the map without holding assetsMutex while a long-running cleanup goroutine and (re-entrant) CSS-rewriting code path concurrently write to it under the lock. When the unsynchronized read coincides with a synchronized write, Go's runtime raises fatal error: concurrent map read and map write — a runtime.throw that is not recoverable by http.Server's handler-panic recover. The whole Mailpit process exits, taking the SMTP, POP3 and HTTP listeners down with it. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch. |
| Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the Mailpit SMTP server has a Server.MaxSize int field that controls the maximum allowed DATA payload size, but the field is never assigned anywhere outside test code, leaving it at Go's zero value (0 ⇒ "no limit"). The same applies to the HTTP /api/v1/send endpoint, whose request body is decoded with json.NewDecoder(r.Body) and no http.MaxBytesReader. Because Mailpit's default listeners bind [::]:1025 (SMTP) and [::]:8025 (HTTP), with no authentication required on either, a single network-reachable attacker can push an arbitrarily large message into Mailpit and watch RAM consumption spike with a ~7-10× amplification factor (raw frame → enmime envelope tree → search-text index → zstd-encoded write to SQLite). Repeating the attack — or running it concurrently from multiple connections — drives the process to OOM-kill. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch. |
| Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.1, the fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, "Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags), and `POST /api/v1/message/{id}/release` (ReleaseMessage) still call `json.NewDecoder(r.Body)` directly with no body-size cap and remain reachable unauthenticated in the default `docker run axllent/mailpit:latest` deploy. An unauthenticated remote attacker can post a multi-million-element `IDs` slice and drive RSS from ~25 MiB baseline to ~450 MiB per 16 MB request body. Repeating across multiple connections accumulates the same per-request amplification per process. Version 1.30.1 contains a patch. |
| Datadog dd-trace-py is the Datadog Python APM client. Prior to 4.8.2, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.8.2. |
| A flaw has been found in LiuMengxuan04 MiniCode 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function child_process.spawn of the file mcp.ts. Executing a manipulation can lead to command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. |
| OpenTelemetry Rust is the Rust OpenTelemetry implementation. In 0.32.0 and earlier, BaggagePropagator::extract_with_context in opentelemetry_sdk did not enforce W3C Baggage size limits before parsing an inbound baggage header, so a large attacker-controlled header could cause unnecessary CPU work and short-lived heap allocations while parsing entries later discarded by the SDK's baggage storage limits. Services that accept untrusted inbound propagation headers may experience increased per-request resource usage when processing oversized baggage headers. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.1. |
| IBM Engineering Lifecycle Management 7.0.3 ( Interim Fix 001 through ) Interim Fix 021, 7.1.0 ( Interim Fix 001 through ) Interim Fix 009, and 7.2.0 and 7.2.0 Interim Fix 001 DOORS could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to improper handling of XML entity expansion. |
| Datadog dd-trace-go is a Go client library for Datadog application performance monitoring, profiling, and security monitoring. Prior to 2.8.1, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1. |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeDecoder fails to limit the total number of headers or their cumulative size per frame, and the maxLineLength parameter only restricts individual header lines. An attacker can send a large number of short headers that are accumulated in memory inside DefaultStompHeadersSubframe until the JVM throws an OutOfMemoryError, causing denial of service for servers exposing a STOMP endpoint based on StompSubframeDecoder. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix cancellation of a DIO and single read subrequests
When the preparation of a new subrequest for a read fails, if the
subrequest has already been added to the stream->subrequests list, it can't
simply be put and abandoned as the collector may see it. Also, if it
hasn't been queued yet, it has two outstanding refs that both need to be
put. Both DIO read and single-read dispatch fail at this; further, both
differ in the order they do things to the way buffered read works.
Fix cancellation of both DIO-read and single-read subrequests that failed
preparation by the following steps:
(1) Harmonise all three reads (buffered, dio, single) to queue the subreq
before prepping it.
(2) Make all three call netfs_queue_read() to do the queuing.
(3) Set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED independently of the queuing as we don't
know the length of the subreq at this point.
(4) In all cases, set the error and NETFS_SREQ_FAILED flag on the subreq
and then call netfs_read_subreq_terminated() to deal with it. This
will pass responsibility off to the collector for dealing with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak and ignored error in nfsd4_create_file
nfsd4_create_file() has two bugs in its ACL handling:
The return value of nfsd4_acl_to_attr() is silently discarded. When
the NFSv4-to-POSIX ACL conversion fails (e.g., -EINVAL for
unsupported ACE types), the file is created without any ACL and the
client receives NFS4_OK. This violates RFC 7530/8881 which require
the server to reject unsupported attributes on CREATE.
When start_creating() fails after ACL attributes have been populated
in attrs (either via nfsd4_acl_to_attr or via ownership transfer from
open->op_dpacl/op_pacl), the function jumps to out_write which skips
nfsd_attrs_free(). The posix_acl allocations are leaked. A client
can trigger this repeatedly with OPEN(CREATE), ACL attributes, and an
invalid filename (e.g., longer than NAME_MAX).
Fix both by capturing the nfsd4_acl_to_attr() return value and by
changing the early error paths to jump to out instead of out_write.
Initialize child to ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) so that end_creating() is safe
to call even if start_creating() was never reached. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix dead ACL conflict guard in nfsd4_create
nfsd4_create() steals create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl into the local
nfsd_attrs via the designated initializer, then immediately sets the
source pointers to NULL. The subsequent conflict guard tests the
already-nilled source fields, making it permanently dead code:
if (create->cr_acl) {
if (create->cr_dpacl || create->cr_pacl) /* always false */
When a client encodes both FATTR4_WORD0_ACL and
FATTR4_WORD2_POSIX_{DEFAULT,ACCESS}_ACL in the same CREATE fattr
bitmap, nfsd4_acl_to_attr() overwrites attrs.na_pacl/na_dpacl without
releasing the originals, leaking two posix_acl slab objects per
request. Repeated requests cause unbounded slab exhaustion.
Fix by checking attrs.na_dpacl/na_pacl (the stolen values) instead of
the nilled create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl, matching the correct pattern
already used in nfsd4_setattr(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: avoid leaking pre-allocated openowner on unconfirmed retry race
When find_or_alloc_open_stateowner() encounters an unconfirmed owner, it
calls release_openowner() and sets oo = NULL. Control then falls through
past the `if (oo)` guard -- which would have freed any pre-allocated
`new` -- and unconditionally executes `new = alloc_stateowner(...)`. If
`new` was already allocated on a prior iteration, the pointer is
silently overwritten and the previous allocation (slab object + owner
name buffer) is leaked.
This requires a race: two NFSv4.0 OPEN threads with the same owner
string, where a concurrent thread inserts a new unconfirmed owner into
the hash between retry iterations. The window is narrow but repeatable
under adversarial conditions.
Fix by adding `goto retry` after `oo = NULL` so the already-allocated
`new` is reused on the next iteration rather than overwritten. |
| Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.1.0 for Perl allow remote memory exhaustion via an uncapped peer-wire message-length prefix.
The peer-wire framing in _process_messages trusts the 4-byte length prefix sent by a connected peer with no upper bound, while receive_data appends every inbound byte to the input buffer. A peer announces a length prefix of up to about 4 GiB and then streams bytes; the decoder waits until the buffer holds the full message before processing it, so the buffer grows without limit.
Peer connections are unauthenticated, so any peer in the swarm exhausts the downloading process's memory. The largest legitimate message is a 16 KiB piece block, so any announced length far above that is anomalous. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: always recover the gpu
Previously, in case there was no more work to do, recover worker
wouldn't trigger recovery and would instead rely on the gpu going to
sleep and then resuming when more work is submitted.
Recover_worker will first increment the fence of the hung ring so, if
there's only one job submitted to a ring and that causes an hang, it
will early out.
There's no guarantee that the gpu will suspend and resume before more
work is submitted and if the gpu is in a hung state it will stay in that
state and probably trigger a timeout again.
Just stop checking and always recover the gpu.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/704066/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: call missing mem_cgroup_iter_break()
damon_sysfs_memcg_path_to_id() breaks mem_cgroup_iter() loop without
calling mem_cgroup_iter_break(). This leaks the cgroup reference. Fix
the issue by calling mem_cgroup_iter_break() before the break.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
