| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the mailpit dump --http <base-url> <out-dir> sub-command downloads every message from a remote Mailpit instance and writes each one as <id>.eml inside the user-supplied output directory. The message ID field is taken verbatim from the JSON response of the remote server and concatenated into the output path with path.Join, which silently normalizes `..` segments. A malicious HTTP server impersonating Mailpit can therefore make mailpit dump write attacker-controlled bytes to any path the running user can write, fully outside the intended output directory. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp
In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read()
but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains
uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported
as a measurement result.
Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported
in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage.
This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the
variable as used uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix data-race on iso_pi fields in hci_get_route calls
iso_connect_bis(), iso_connect_cis(), iso_listen_bis(), and
iso_conn_big_sync() call hci_get_route() using iso_pi(sk)->dst,
iso_pi(sk)->src, and iso_pi(sk)->src_type without holding lock_sock().
These fields may be modified concurrently by connect() or setsockopt()
on the same socket, resulting in data-races reported by KCSAN.
Fix this by snapshotting the required fields under lock_sock() before
calling hci_get_route().
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in memcmp+0x45/0xb0
race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff8880122135cf of 1 bytes
by task 333 on cpu 1:
memcmp+0x45/0xb0
hci_get_route+0x27e/0x490
iso_connect_cis+0x4c/0xa10
iso_sock_connect+0x60e/0xb30
__sys_connect_file+0xbd/0xe0
__sys_connect+0xe0/0x110
__x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50
x64_sys_call+0xcad/0x1c60
do_syscall_64+0x133/0x590
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error
compat_riscv_gpr_set() calls cregs_to_regs() unconditionally, even when
user_regset_copyin() fails. Since cregs is an uninitialized stack
variable, a copyin failure causes uninitialized stack data to be written
into the target task's pt_regs, corrupting its register state and
potentially leaking kernel stack contents.
compat_restore_sigcontext() has the same issue: it calls cregs_to_regs()
even when __copy_from_user() fails, leading to the same corruption of
the signal-returning task's register state on error.
Only call cregs_to_regs() when the user copy succeeds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()
ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers.
Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: eb_tables: close module init race
sashiko reports for unrelated patch:
Does the core ebtables initialization in ebtables.c suffer from a similar race?
Once nf_register_sockopt() completes, the sockopts are exposed globally.
sockopt has to be registered last, just like in ip/ip6/arptables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge
TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(),
move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right
pointer.
A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2:
[26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI
[26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025
[26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915]
[26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78
[26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282
[26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000
[26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0
[26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0
[26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554
[26620.095612] Call Trace:
[26620.095615] <TASK>
[26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915]
[26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm]
[26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm]
[26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm]
[26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0
[26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
[26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30
[26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915]
[26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm]
[26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm]
[26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm]
[26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0
[26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm]
[26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915]
[26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915]
[26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915]
[26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915]
[26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915]
[26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50
[26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0
[26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915]
Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer
field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being
purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no
longer needed.
Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container
being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content
of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called,
indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement
and caching policy,
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit
The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are
reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto
hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent
drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that
had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace
is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on
the handshake_req allocation.
Pass the source and destination in the documented order
(list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending
list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through
handshake_complete().
Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After
the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers,
threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests.
A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's
TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not
taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls
remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list).
__remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the
scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same
call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an
entry hits LIST_POISON instead.
Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under
hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The
drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing
test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates
between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use
list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list
does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry.
The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false,
but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference.
Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees
the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list.
Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list,
and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free in llcp_sock_release()
llcp_sock_release() unconditionally unlinks the socket from the local
sockets list. However, if the socket is still in connecting state, it
is on the connecting list.
Fix this by checking the socket state and unlinking from the correct list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data
When bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist
entry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right
fragment.
The right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with
`start`, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a
non-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split
layout inconsistent.
Advance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta,
`start - offset`, which matches the length removed from the front of the
original entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec
requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del
may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and
in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned
previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so
instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel
asynchronously. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7
ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2
ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9
ip netns del ns2
ip netns del ns1
[ 132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!
Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped
NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then
move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points
at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns.
vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and
dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink
into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry.
cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.
Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user
--map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: add hook transactions for device deletions
Restore the flag that indicates that the hook is going away, ie.
NFT_HOOK_REMOVE, but add a new transaction object to track deletion
of hooks without altering the basechain/flowtable hook_list during
the preparation phase.
The existing approach that moves the hook from the basechain/flowtable
hook_list to transaction hook_list breaks netlink dump path readers
of this RCU-protected list.
It should be possible use an array for nft_trans_hook to store the
deleted hooks to compact the representation but I am not expecting
many hook object, specially now that wildcard support for devices
is in place.
Note that the nft_trans_chain_hooks() list contains a list of struct
nft_trans_hook objects for DELCHAIN and DELFLOWTABLE commands, while
this list stores struct nft_hook objects for NEWCHAIN and NEWFLOWTABLE.
Note that new commands can be updated to use nft_trans_hook for
consistency.
This patch also adapts the event notification path to deal with the list
of hook transactions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: i801: fix hardware state machine corruption in error path
A severe livelock and subsequent Hung Task panic were observed in the
i2c-i801 driver during concurrent Fuzzing. The crash is caused by an
unconditional hardware register cleanup in the error handling path of
i801_access().
When i801_check_pre() fails (e.g., returning -EBUSY because the SMBus
controller is actively used by BIOS/ACPI), the kernel does not actually
acquire the hardware ownership. However, the code jumps to the 'out'
label and executes:
iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv));
This forcefully clears the INUSE_STS lock and resets the hardware status
flags without owning the controller. Doing so interrupts ongoing BIOS/ACPI
transactions and totally corrupts the SMBus hardware state machine.
Consequently, all subsequent i801_access() calls fail at the pre-check
stage, triggering an endless stream of "SMBus is busy, can't use it!"
error logs. Over a slow serial console, this printk flood monopolizes
the CPU (Console Livelock), starving other processes trying to acquire
the mmap_lock down_read semaphore, ultimately triggering the hung task
watchdog.
Fix this by moving the 'out' label below the hardware register cleanup.
If i801_check_pre() fails, we safely bypass the iowrite8() and only
release the software locks (pm_runtime and mutex), strictly adhering to
the rule of not releasing resources that were never acquired. |
| Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository's main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target and multiple jobs check out the attacker's fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: "NONE" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in Sipeed PicoClaw up to 0.2.9. Affected is the function NewContextBuilder of the file pkg/agent/context.go. Such manipulation leads to inclusion of functionality from untrusted control sphere. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The reported GitHub issue was closed automatically with the label "not planned" by a bot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()
rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with
hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However,
RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler ->
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and
dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is
a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the
egress_dev pointer.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101)
rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235)
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208)
netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467)
tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)
tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
</TASK>
Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with
kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace
period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the
nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set
ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race
with lockless readers. |
| Microsoft Streaming Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
