| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame
iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock
before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill()
can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and
sock_queue_rcv_skb().
Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which
calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the
refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is
called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: refresh tcphdr after skb_ensure_writable
synproxy_tstamp_adjust() rewrites the TCP timestamp option in place
and then patches the TCP checksum via inet_proto_csum_replace4() on
the caller-supplied tcphdr pointer. Both ipv4_synproxy_hook() and
ipv6_synproxy_hook() obtain that pointer with skb_header_pointer()
before calling in, so it may either alias skb->head directly or
point at the caller's on-stack _tcph buffer.
Between obtaining the pointer and using it, the function calls
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend), which on a cloned or non-linear
skb invokes pskb_expand_head() and frees the old skb->head. After
that point the cached th is stale:
caller (ipv[46]_synproxy_hook)
th = skb_header_pointer(skb, ..., &_tcph)
synproxy_tstamp_adjust(skb, protoff, th, ...)
skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend)
pskb_expand_head() /* kfree(old skb->head) */
...
inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, ...)
/* writes into freed head, or
into the caller's stack copy
leaving the on-wire checksum
stale */
The option bytes are written through skb->data and are fine; only
the checksum update goes through th and so lands in the wrong
place. The result is either a write into freed slab memory or a
packet leaving with a checksum that does not match its payload.
Fix by re-deriving th from skb->data + protoff immediately after
skb_ensure_writable() succeeds, so the subsequent checksum update
targets the linear, writable header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc()
A race condition exists in the NFC LLCP connection state machine where
the connection acceptance packet (CC) can be processed concurrently with
socket release. This can lead to a use-after-free of the socket object.
When nfc_llcp_recv_cc() moves the socket from the connecting_sockets
list to the sockets list, it does so without holding the socket lock.
If llcp_sock_release() is executing concurrently, it might have already
unlinked the socket and dropped its references, which can result in
nfc_llcp_recv_cc() linking a freed socket into the live list.
Fix this by holding lock_sock() during the state transition and list
movement in nfc_llcp_recv_cc(). After acquiring the lock, check if
the socket is still hashed to ensure it hasn't already been unlinked
and marked for destruction by the release path. This aligns the locking
pattern with recv_hdlc() and recv_disc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup
Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find()
in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the
assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from
the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.
The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring
semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling
uses a different model.
Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking
that the assoc_array was designed for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: fix a potential use-after-free
On error we free aggr->lookups->dev_id before removing the entry from
the lookup table. If a concurrent thread calls gpiod_find() before we
remove the entry, it could iterate over the list and call
gpiod_match_lookup_table() which unconditionally dereferences dev_id
when calling strcmp(). Reverse the order of cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: shaper: rework the VALID marking (again)
Recent commit changed the semantics from NOT_VALID to VALID.
I didn't realize that the flags are not stored atomically
with the entry in XArray. There's still a race of reader
observing a VALID mark for a slot, getting interrupted,
writer replacing the entry with a different one, reader
continuing, fetching the entry which is now a different
pointer than the pointer for which VALID was meant.
The biggest consequence of this is that we may see a UAF
since net_shaper_rollback() assumed that entries without
VALID can be freed without observing RCU.
Looks like the XArray marks are buying us nothing at this
point. Let's convert the code to an explicit valid field.
The smp_load_acquire() / smp_store_release() barriers are
marginally cleaner. |
| Use after free in Ozone in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use After Free vulnerability in the Rust deserialization logic of Apache Fory. This issue affects Apache Fory from 0.13.0 through 1.3.0.
A crafted Fory payload could cause undefined behavior, process crash, or potential memory disclosure.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.4.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Use after free in Touchbar in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in IME in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in DOM in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Forms in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Journeys in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Core in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in GPU in Google Chrome on Android prior to 150.0.7871.128 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in Network in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.128 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in WebView in Google Chrome on Android prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
