| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: rt9455: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: hci: shdlc: Stop timers and work before freeing context
llc_shdlc_deinit() purges SHDLC skb queues and frees the llc_shdlc
structure while its timers and state machine work may still be active.
Timer callbacks can schedule sm_work, and sm_work accesses SHDLC state
and the skb queues. If teardown happens in parallel with a queued/running
work item, it can lead to UAF and other shutdown races.
Stop all SHDLC timers and cancel sm_work synchronously before purging the
queues and freeing the context.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pseries/papr-hvpipe: Fix race with interrupt handler
While executing ->ioctl handler or ->release handler, if an interrupt
fires on the same cpu, then we can enter into a deadlock.
This patch fixes both these handlers to take spin_lock_irq{save|restore}
versions of the lock to prevent this deadlock. |
| Use after free in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Dawn in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Cast in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to execute arbitrary code via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix potential UAF and memory leak in remove path
Unregister the hwrng to prevent new ->read() calls and flush the Atmel
I2C workqueue before teardown to prevent a potential UAF if a queued
callback runs while the device is being removed.
Drop the early return to ensure sysfs entries are removed and
->hwrng.priv is freed, preventing a memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix use-after-free in ocfs2_fault() when VM_FAULT_RETRY
filemap_fault() may drop the mmap_lock before returning VM_FAULT_RETRY,
as documented in mm/filemap.c:
"If our return value has VM_FAULT_RETRY set, it's because the mmap_lock
may be dropped before doing I/O or by lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap()."
When this happens, a concurrent munmap() can call remove_vma() and free
the vm_area_struct via RCU. The saved 'vma' pointer in ocfs2_fault() then
becomes a dangling pointer, and the subsequent trace_ocfs2_fault() call
dereferences it -- a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving ip_blkno as a plain integer before calling
filemap_fault(), and removing vma from the trace event. Since
ip_blkno is copied by value before the lock can be dropped, it
remains valid regardless of what happens to the vma or inode
afterward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe()
In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
as102_usb_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t
....
usb_register_dev();
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd
....
usb_deregister_dev();
....
kfree(); // free as102_dev_t
....
sys_close(fd);
as102_release() // UAF!!
as102_usb_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later
unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is
removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are
already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last
reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked.
In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an
error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away.
If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that
open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access
or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln.
The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev()
has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release().
In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open
FD is closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()
In hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
hackrf_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev
....
v4l2_device_register();
....
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open hackrf fd
....
v4l2_device_unregister();
....
kfree(); // free hackrf_dev
....
sys_ioctl(fd, ...);
v4l2_ioctl();
video_is_registered() // UAF!!
....
sys_close(fd);
v4l2_release() // UAF!!
hackrf_video_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so
new open() calls are blocked.
However, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do
not terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is
dropped and the driver's release() is invoked.
Therefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe()
has registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since
those already-open handles haven't been released yet.
And since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln occur.
To prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be
modified to free memory only through release() rather than calling
kfree() directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Synchronize interrupts before suspending the GPU
The runtime PM suspend callback doesn't know whether the IRQ handler is
in progress on a different CPU core and doesn't wait for it to finish.
Depending on timing, the IRQ handler could be running while the GPU is
suspended, leading to kernel crashes when trying to access GPU
registers. See example signature below.
In a power off sequence initiated by the runtime PM suspend callback,
wait for any IRQ handlers in progress on other CPU cores to finish, by
calling synchronize_irq().
At the same time, remove the runtime PM resume/put calls in the threaded
IRQ handler. On top of not being the right approach to begin with, and
being at the wrong place as they should have wrapped all GPU register
accesses, the driver would hit a deadlock between synchronize_irq()
being called from a runtime PM suspend callback, holding the device
power lock, and the resume callback requiring the same.
Example crash signature on a TI AM68 SK platform:
[ 337.241218] SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0x00000000bf000000 -- SError
[ 337.241239] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 112 Comm: irq/234-gpu Tainted: G M 6.17.7-B2C-00005-g9c7bbe4ea16c #2 PREEMPT
[ 337.241246] Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK
[ 337.241249] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM68 SK (DT)
[ 337.241252] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 337.241256] pc : pvr_riscv_irq_pending+0xc/0x24
[ 337.241277] lr : pvr_device_irq_thread_handler+0x64/0x310
[ 337.241282] sp : ffff800085b0bd30
[ 337.241284] x29: ffff800085b0bd50 x28: ffff0008070d9eab x27: ffff800083a5ce10
[ 337.241291] x26: ffff000806e48f80 x25: ffff0008070d9eac x24: 0000000000000000
[ 337.241296] x23: ffff0008068e9bf0 x22: ffff0008068e9bd0 x21: ffff800085b0bd30
[ 337.241301] x20: ffff0008070d9e00 x19: ffff0008068e9000 x18: 0000000000000001
[ 337.241305] x17: 637365645f656c70 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff000b7df9ff40
[ 337.241310] x14: 0000a585fe3c0d0e x13: 000000999704f060 x12: 000000000002771a
[ 337.241314] x11: 00000000000000c0 x10: 0000000000000af0 x9 : ffff800085b0bd00
[ 337.241318] x8 : ffff0008071175d0 x7 : 000000000000b955 x6 : 0000000000000003
[ 337.241323] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 337.241327] x2 : ffff800080e39d20 x1 : ffff800080e3fc48 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 337.241333] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
[ 337.241337] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 112 Comm: irq/234-gpu Tainted: G M 6.17.7-B2C-00005-g9c7bbe4ea16c #2 PREEMPT
[ 337.241342] Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK
[ 337.241343] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM68 SK (DT)
[ 337.241345] Call trace:
[ 337.241348] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
[ 337.241357] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
[ 337.241364] dump_stack+0x18/0x24
[ 337.241368] vpanic+0x124/0x2ec
[ 337.241373] abort+0x0/0x4
[ 337.241377] add_taint+0x0/0xbc
[ 337.241384] arm64_serror_panic+0x70/0x80
[ 337.241389] do_serror+0x3c/0x74
[ 337.241392] el1h_64_error_handler+0x30/0x48
[ 337.241400] el1h_64_error+0x6c/0x70
[ 337.241404] pvr_riscv_irq_pending+0xc/0x24 (P)
[ 337.241410] irq_thread_fn+0x2c/0xb0
[ 337.241416] irq_thread+0x170/0x334
[ 337.241421] kthread+0x12c/0x210
[ 337.241428] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 337.241434] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 337.241451] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 337.241453] CPU features: 0x040000,02002800,20002001,0400421b
[ 337.241456] Memory Limit: none
[ 337.457921] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt ]--- |
| Use after free in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix race in devmap on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_dev_bulk_queue (bq) can be
accessed concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.
The original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush() run atomically
with respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on
local_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT,
local_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable
preemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during
bq_xmit_all(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter
bq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.
This leads to several races:
1. Double-free / use-after-free on bq->q[]: bq_xmit_all() snapshots
cnt = bq->count, then iterates bq->q[0..cnt-1] to transmit frames.
If preempted after the snapshot, a second task can call bq_enqueue()
-> bq_xmit_all() on the same bq, transmitting (and freeing) the
same frames. When the first task resumes, it operates on stale
pointers in bq->q[], causing use-after-free.
2. bq->count and bq->q[] corruption: concurrent bq_enqueue() modifying
bq->count and bq->q[] while bq_xmit_all() is reading them.
3. dev_rx/xdp_prog teardown race: __dev_flush() clears bq->dev_rx and
bq->xdp_prog after bq_xmit_all(). If preempted between
bq_xmit_all() return and bq->dev_rx = NULL, a preempting
bq_enqueue() sees dev_rx still set (non-NULL), skips adding bq to
the flush_list, and enqueues a frame. When __dev_flush() resumes,
it clears dev_rx and removes bq from the flush_list, orphaning the
newly enqueued frame.
4. __list_del_clearprev() on flush_node: similar to the cpumap race,
both tasks can call __list_del_clearprev() on the same flush_node,
the second dereferences the prev pointer already set to NULL.
The race between task A (__dev_flush -> bq_xmit_all) and task B
(bq_enqueue -> bq_xmit_all) on the same CPU:
Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (ndo_xdp_xmit redirect)
---------------------- --------------------------------
__dev_flush(flush_list)
bq_xmit_all(bq)
cnt = bq->count /* e.g. 16 */
/* start iterating bq->q[] */
<-- CFS preempts Task A -->
bq_enqueue(dev, xdpf)
bq->count == DEV_MAP_BULK_SIZE
bq_xmit_all(bq, 0)
cnt = bq->count /* same 16! */
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* frames freed by driver */
bq->count = 0
<-- Task A resumes -->
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* use-after-free: frames already freed! */
Fix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_dev_bulk_queue and acquiring
it in bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush(). These paths already run under
local_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is
a pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a
per-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: pm8916_lbc: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: pf1550: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "hwmon: (ibmpex) fix use-after-free in high/low store"
This reverts commit 6946c726c3f4c36f0f049e6f97e88c510b15f65d.
Jean Delvare points out that the patch does not completely
fix the reported problem, that it in fact introduces a
(new) race condition, and that it may actually not be needed in
the first place.
Various AI reviews agree. Specific and relevant AI feedback:
"
This reordering sets the driver data to NULL before removing the sensor
attributes in the loop below.
ibmpex_show_sensor() retrieves this driver data via dev_get_drvdata() but
does not check if it is NULL before dereferencing it to access
data->sensors[].
If a userspace process reads a sensor file (like temp1_input) while this
delete function is running, could it race with the dev_set_drvdata(...,
NULL) call here and crash in ibmpex_show_sensor()?
Would it be safer to keep the original order where device_remove_file() is
called before clearing the driver data? device_remove_file() should wait
for any active sysfs callbacks to complete, which might already prevent the
use-after-free this patch intends to fix.
"
Revert the offending patch. If it can be shown that the originally reported
alleged race condition does indeed exist, it can always be re-introduced
with a complete fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: pm8916_bms_vm: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: cpcap-battery: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: sbs-battery: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle. Keep the old behavior of
just printing a warning in case of any failures during the IRQ request
and finishing the probe successfully. |
