| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| BookWyrm through 0.9.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the edit_readthrough function that allows authenticated users to modify other users' reading records. Attackers can exploit sequential ReadThrough IDs to overwrite arbitrary users' start dates, finish dates, progress, and progress mode, affecting reading statistics and exported data. |
| The Otter Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks, Page Builder for Gutenberg Editor & FSE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.7 via the 'watch_checkout' function due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to pay for a lower-cost product while obtaining entitlement for a premium product by manipulating the product_id parameter independently of the price_id parameter in the Stripe checkout URL. |
| Improper restriction of XML external entity reference vulnerability in Cosminexus Component Container.
This issue affects Cosminexus Component Container: from 11-70-01 before 11-70-03, from 11-60 before 11-60-03, from 11-50 through 11-50-03, from 11-40 through 11-40-03, from 11-30 through 11-30-08, from 11-20 before 11-20-10, from 11-10 through 11-10-11, from 11-00 before 11-00-13, from 09-87 before 09-87-10, from 09-80 before 09-80-05, from 09-70 before 09-70-28, from 09-50 through 09-50-22, and from 09-00 through 09-00-18. |
| nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1. |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 an IDOR in the user profile API disclosed private issues and starred folders across organizations |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 iDOR via the watchRules and issueListConfig endpoints exposed private saved searches |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18634 signed URL reuse allowed disclosure of restricted project icons |
| Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Arbitrary account takeover in miniOrange OAuth Client < 3.2.0, OAuth Single Sign-On – OIDC SSO < 1.2.2, Login with Keycloak OAuth Single Sign-On (SSO) < 1.2.2, Single Sign-On for Educational Institutes < 1.2.2 - The manipulation of a cookie value allows actors to login as arbitrary accounts, including admins. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads()
When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP),
do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all
threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If
one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes
zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads()
aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0
and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it
fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread.
When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and
checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag,
it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop().
Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the
already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning:
sig->group_stop_count == 0
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373
task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619
get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98
do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the
calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any
stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns
with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group
stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly
clear these flags for all threads including the current one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in
fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK *** |
| A flaw was found in the reset-credentials flow of the keycloak-services component, which is the core engine for identity and access management in Red Hat Build of Keycloak. The issue allows an unauthenticated attacker to force the password reset process for any user without needing to click the required email verification link. This can result in the attacker gaining full control over target user accounts by directly setting new credentials. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC Field PG M6 (All versions < V26.01.12), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions < V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions < V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543A (All versions < V36.01.03), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions < V35.01.12), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions < V1.1.4), SIMATIC IPC RW-543B (All versions < V35.02.10), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions < V27.01.11), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC277G PRO (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to disable the BIOS password without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions < V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions < V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543A (All versions < V36.01.03), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions < V35.01.12), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions < V1.1.4), SIMATIC IPC RW-543B (All versions < V35.02.10), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions < V27.01.11), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC277G PRO (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions < V28.01.14), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions < V21.01.21), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to alter the secure boot configuration without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing locking around retry adding new subreqs
Fix netfs_retry_read_subrequests() and netfs_retry_write_stream() to take
the appropriate lock when adding extra subrequests into
stream->subrequests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix potential deadloop in prepare_compress_overwrite()
Jan Prusakowski reported a kernel hang issue as below:
When running xfstests on linux-next kernel (6.14.0-rc3, 6.12) I
encountered a problem in generic/475 test where fsstress process
gets blocked in __f2fs_write_data_pages() and the test hangs.
The options I used are:
MKFS_OPTIONS -- -O compression -O extra_attr -O project_quota -O quota /dev/vdc
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o acl,user_xattr -o discard,compress_extension=* /dev/vdc /vdc
INFO: task kworker/u8:0:11 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-xfstests-lockdep #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u8:0 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00004000
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x309/0x8e0
schedule+0x3a/0x100
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
__mutex_lock+0x59a/0xdb0
__f2fs_write_data_pages+0x3ac/0x400
do_writepages+0xe8/0x290
__writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x360
writeback_sb_inodes+0x22f/0x570
wb_writeback+0xb0/0x410
wb_do_writeback+0x47/0x2f0
wb_workfn+0x5a/0x1c0
process_one_work+0x223/0x5b0
worker_thread+0x1d5/0x3c0
kthread+0xfd/0x230
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
The root cause is: once generic/475 starts toload error table to dm
device, f2fs_prepare_compress_overwrite() will loop reading compressed
cluster pages due to IO error, meanwhile it has held .writepages lock,
it can block all other writeback tasks.
Let's fix this issue w/ below changes:
- add f2fs_handle_page_eio() in prepare_compress_overwrite() to
detect IO error.
- detect cp_error earler in f2fs_read_multi_pages(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: mark GFP_NOIO around sysfs ->store()
sysfs ->store is called with queue freezed, meantime we have several
->store() callbacks(update_nr_requests, wbt, scheduler) to allocate
memory with GFP_KERNEL which may run into direct reclaim code path,
then potential deadlock can be caused.
Fix the issue by marking NOIO around sysfs ->store() |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox contains an open redirect vulnerability via the
“replyUrl” parameter. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to
craft a URL within the application that, when visited, redirects the
user’s browser to an arbitrary third-party site. This can be abused for
phishing attacks, where users receive a trusted domain link but are
redirected to a phishing website. This issue affects TeamDavid before Rollout 528.
Starting with Rollout 528 (June 30, 2026), the affected functionality is disabled by default and the vulnerabilities are therefore no longer exposed through this functionality. |
| Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox application is vulnerable to HTTP header injection through the
“cType” URL parameter, which allows arbitrary modification of the
Content-Type header in HTTP responses. Because the parameter does not
properly restrict control characters such as URL-encoded newlines
(“%0a”) or colons, attackers can inject additional headers including
extra Location headers into the server’s response. This results e.g. in
an open redirect vulnerability. This issue affects TeamDavid before Rollout 528.
Starting with Rollout 528 (June 30, 2026), the affected functionality is disabled by default and the vulnerabilities are therefore no longer exposed through this functionality. |
| The Webbox of TeamDavid by Tobit Laboratories AG constructs redirect URLs using user-supplied input,
which is appended to the redirect target in a 302 HTTP response. By
using URL-encoded characters such as “%2e” (representing a dot), an
attacker can manipulate the portion of the URL following the top-level
domain (TLD). If a similar, registerable TLD exists (for example, if
“.com” is the application’s domain, and “.company” is available for
registration), an attacker can craft a URL to redirect users to a
malicious “.company” domain. By using URL-encoded line feeds, it becomes
possible to insert arbitrary response headers in the server's HTTP
response.
This issue affects TeamDavid before Rollout 528.
Starting with Rollout 528 (June 30, 2026), the affected functionality is disabled by default and the vulnerabilities are therefore no longer exposed through this functionality. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Brainstorm Force SureForms allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.
This issue affects SureForms: from n/a through 2.12.5. |
