| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out of bounds read in Dawn in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Prior to version 1.0.19, `decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_tiles` (libde265/decctx.cc:920) reads `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS[ctbAddrRS]` at line 966 where `ctbAddrRS = ctbY * ctbsWidth + ctbX` is computed from PPS-supplied `colBd[]`/`rowBd[]` arrays without validating the result against `CtbAddrRStoTS.size() == sps->PicSizeInCtbsY`. A malformed PPS that passes `set_derived_values` but encodes geometry inconsistent with the SPS produces a `ctbAddrRS` past the allocation, causing a 4-byte heap-buffer-overflow READ. Version 1.0.19 fixes the issue. |
| Out-of-bounds read, Reachable assertion vulnerability in Samsung Open Source Escargot allows Overread Buffers, Input Data Manipulation.
This issue affects Escargot: before 2dee22f5c7b8bf31cb7252d7731fae8c07f2842c. |
| OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) has an out-of-bounds read issue in CIP message parsing when handling malformed explicit requests with a forged EPath size. An attacker can send a valid ENIP SendRRData frame carrying a very short CIP payload whose path_size field claims that many more path words are present than are actually available. Because the parser trusts the attacker-controlled path_size and continues decoding path segments without a remaining-length boundary, it reads beyond the end of the stack receive buffer. |
| A out-of-bounds read vulnerability in Fortinet FortiAuthenticator 6.6.0 through 6.6.2, FortiAuthenticator 6.5 all versions may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to retrieve sensitive information via a specially crafted request. |
| FFmpeg versions 0.7.1 through 8.1.2 contain an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the S/PDIF muxer that allows attackers to access memory beyond buffer boundaries by supplying a crafted DTS stream with a core_size value larger than the actual packet length. Attackers can exploit the missing bounds check in the spdif_header_dts4 function by providing a malicious DTS-HD audio stream during S/PDIF re-muxing to trigger unauthorized memory reads beyond the packet buffer. |
| Out-of-bounds Read in ASUS System Control Interface v3, ASUS System Control Interface, and ASUS Business Manager allows a local administrator to read memory regions beyond the intended firmware boundary by supplying a crafted IOCTL request that bypasses the validation.
Refer to the ' Security Update for ASUS System Control Interface ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information. |
| The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers. |
| A flaw was found in libssh. During server-side GSSAPI key exchange, a client-supplied Curve25519 public key shorter than the expected length is copied without proper length validation, leading to an out-of-bounds heap read. This could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to disclose small amounts of server memory. |
| In Eclipse OMR versions up to 0.11, the arraycmp SIMD implementation for Z and P does not check if the number of bytes to compare is zero. |
| A flaw was found in the sbc library (BlueZ SBC codec). An off-by-one error in the SBC frame decoder allows a crafted audio payload to trigger a one-byte heap out-of-bounds read. This could allow an adjacent attacker streaming Bluetooth audio to read a single byte of adjacent heap memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()
Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the
original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add
iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):
1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).
text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then
incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest
in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the
buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
...
rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
}
...
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);
iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so
when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the
text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched
mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text
PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against
the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to
the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text
PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.
Fix by passing the actual padded payload length
(ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().
2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest
drop.
On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler
silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:
kfree(text_in);
return 0;
cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text
Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which
unconditionally does
kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);
cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via
iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free
if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.
On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on
the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so
#4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this
patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three
relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of
this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after
login produces two back-to-back splats:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??
showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in
iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once
more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels
with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free
becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts
the slab freelist.
Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop
path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock
tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4
less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.
Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and
the wire protocol is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow
On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry->length < 4:
1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset],
sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry
with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy
run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a
500-dword block reads block[497..501]).
2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t
to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry
walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails
validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.
Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup,
which closes both holes.
Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after
the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing
uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a
walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that
list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT
(short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the
request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before
copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe
pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks
normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach
the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that
bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a
1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of
non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to
userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte
status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The
interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and
short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller
actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status
fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are
ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630)
dummy_timer() (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button
xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length
and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or
data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's
control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with
actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing
accesses beyond the actual array.
Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the
packet length. |
| An out-of-bounds read (buffer over-read) vulnerability exists in QTextCodec::codecForName() in Qt. When the function is called with a QByteArray that is not NUL-terminated (for example, one created with QByteArray::fromRawData()), the codec-name matching routine reads past the end of the supplied buffer. In most cases this results in an incorrect text codec being selected; in the worst case, if the over-read reaches unmapped memory, the process crashes (denial of service). The over-read is bounded by the length of the longest codec-name candidate, and the out-of-bounds bytes are only compared internally against Qt's fixed list of codec names, so no data is disclosed to an attacker. Applications that do not pass non-NUL-terminated QByteArrays to QTextCodec::codecForName() are not exposed. The affected code resides in the Qt5Compat module from Qt 6.0.0 onward, and in Qt Core (qtbase) in Qt 4.x and Qt 5.x. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Prior to version 1.22.0, `Track::init_sample_timing_table()` in `libheif/sequences/track.cc` stores an out-of-bounds chunk index (`m_chunks.size()`) into `m_presentation_timeline` when the number of chunks defined in the `stco` box is less than the number of samples in `stsz`. A subsequent call to `heif_track_get_next_raw_sequence_sample()` reads `m_chunks[chunk_idx]` with that OOB index, causing a heap-buffer-overflow. Version 1.22.0 fixes the issue. |
| Out of bounds read in ANGLE in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Versions prior to 1.0.19 have a heap buffer overflow (out-of-bounds READ) exists in `decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_WPP()` in `libde265/decctx.cc`. When decoding a WPP (Wavefront Parallel Processing) HEVC slice, `ctbAddrRS` is computed as `ctbRow * ctbsWidth` inside the entry-point loop. If the PPS/SPS headers are crafted so that this value exceeds `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS.size()`, the subsequent array access `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS[ctbAddrRS]` reads past the end of the allocated vector, triggering a heap-buffer-overflow confirmed by AddressSanitizer. Version 1.0.19 patches the issue. |
