| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.3 contains a file upload extension bypass in the API media controller. HandlesMediaUploads::validateFileExtension() inspects only the final file extension via pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION), so a user with api.media.write permission can upload a file with a double extension such as shell.php.jpg to bypass the dangerous extensions blocklist. The web server may then execute the file as PHP, resulting in remote code execution. |
| Grav before 9.1.8 contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability in the Form plugin's process.save.filename parameter, which is validated against path traversal before Twig processing but never re-validated after rendering. Attackers can submit form data containing path traversal sequences that are processed through Twig templates, allowing them to write arbitrary files including PHP webshells to the web root or other sensitive directories. |
| The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 2.0.4 contains an improper session invalidation vulnerability where JWT access tokens are issued without a jti (JWT ID) claim and therefore cannot be revoked server-side. Unlike refresh tokens, access tokens remain valid for their full lifetime (default 1 hour) regardless of logout, password change, new token issuance, or account disablement. An attacker who has stolen an access token retains full API access until the token naturally expires. |
| Grav v2.0.0 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability (fixed in 2.0.1). The XSS blueprint validator (Security::detectXss()) runs on raw page content before Twig processing. When Twig content processing is enabled (twig_content.process_enabled: true), an attacker with page-write API permission can use Twig's string concatenation operator (~) to dynamically construct event handler names, dangerous tag names, or dangerous protocols at render time (e.g. {% set x = "on" ~ "error" %}). The validator sees only the harmless Twig expression and allows the content, but after Twig rendering the output (rendered via {{ page.content|raw }}) contains an active payload such as <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>, executing arbitrary JavaScript in visitors' browsers. |
| Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.7.53, an authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including user/accounts/admin.yaml with the administrator password hash and user/config with site configuration, through the backup download endpoint protected only by the session-static admin-nonce URL parameter. This issue is reported as fixed in version 1.7.53. |
| grav-plugin-database is the database plugin for Grav CMS. Prior to 1.2.0, Database::__call builds PDO DSN strings by directly concatenating user-configurable YAML values from fields such as host, dbname, charset, server, database, directory, and filename without sanitization or validation, allowing an administrator with plugin configuration access to inject DSN attributes or path traversal values. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0. |
| The Grav Admin2 plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-admin2) before 2.0.4 embeds a global JavaScript variable window.__GRAV_CONFIG__ in the Admin2 SPA bootstrap page at /grav/admin (and its subroutes). This object is returned in every unauthenticated response and discloses the server URL, API prefix, admin base path, runtime environment type, and exact Grav and Admin2 version numbers, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to fingerprint the deployment and select version-specific exploits without reconnaissance. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8, Grav allows an unauthenticated visitor to exhaust server memory and CPU by requesting image derivatives with oversized dimensions through URL query image actions such as forceResize in Grav::fallbackUrl, which passes request parameters to ImageMedium magic actions without a dimension or pixel ceiling. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.53 and 2.0.0-rc.8. |
| grav-plugin-admin is an HTML user interface that provides a way to configure Grav and create and modify pages. In 1.10.52 and earlier, an authenticated attacker with admin.users permission can change the password of any user account, including the super administrator, by sending a direct POST request to /admin/user/{username}?task=save with data[password] because saveUser authorizes the caller's user-management permission but does not verify whether the caller may edit the target user. This issue is expected to be fixed in version 1.10.53. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0, an authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool because Installer::unZip calls ZipArchive::extractTo without limits on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-rc.9, Grav's incomplete fix for stored XSS through the Markdown media attribute action (CVE-2026-42841) leaves the sibling MediaObjectTrait::style method reachable through the same Markdown excerpt-action pipeline, allowing an editor to save Markdown image style parameters that are written into the rendered img style attribute without sanitization. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0-rc.9. |
| grav-plugin-database is the database plugin for Grav CMS. Prior to 1.2.0, the PDO::tableExists method interpolates its table argument directly into a raw SQL query string without sanitization, escaping, quoting, or whitelisting, allowing attacker-controlled table names passed by consuming plugin or developer code to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured database. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0. |
| Grav before 2.0.1 contains a decompression bomb vulnerability in ZipArchiver::extract() that lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth. Attackers can supply a crafted ZIP archive that expands to fill available disk space, causing denial of service by exhausting storage resources. |
| The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.3 fails to sanitize SVG files uploaded through the POST /api/v1/media endpoint. The HandlesMediaUploads::processUploadedFile() method validates only the file extension and never invokes Security::sanitizeSVG(), so an authenticated attacker with the api.media.write permission can upload an SVG containing arbitrary JavaScript. The file is stored unmodified and served with Content-Type: image/svg+xml; when an administrator opens it in a browser (directly or via <object>/<iframe>), the embedded script executes in their session context, enabling cookie theft and session hijacking. |
| Grav before 2.0.2 contains a Twig sandbox bypass that allows a page author (any admin.pages user, or anyone able to write to user/pages) to exfiltrate configuration secrets. Although the sandbox replaces the 'config' variable with a redacted facade and strips Config::get/toArray from the method allowlist, the raw container remains accessible via the allow-listed grav.offsetGet('config'), which returns the real Config object. Allow-listed object-dumping filters (json_encode, print_r, yaml_encode) then serialize that object at the PHP level without invoking the sandbox method gate, exposing the full config tree including plugin secrets such as SMTP credentials, API keys, and plugin DB credentials. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9. |
| The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) 1.0.0 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the avatar upload endpoint (/api/v1/users/user/avatar). The endpoint validates only the client-declared MIME type (getClientMediaType) beginning with 'image/' and does not inspect the actual file content or restrict the resulting extension, allowing an authenticated user to store arbitrary content — including PHP code, SVG with embedded JavaScript, and polyglot payloads — under user/accounts/avatars/ with predictable filenames. Direct HTTP access to the stored files is blocked by .htaccess (returns 403), but the files persist on disk and could lead to remote code execution or stored XSS in the presence of a path traversal flaw or server misconfiguration. Fixed in 1.0.1. |
| Grav API plugin before v1.0.0-rc.16 accepts JWT tokens via the ?token= URL query parameter and responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, allowing unauthenticated attackers to make fully authenticated cross-origin API requests from any malicious website. Attackers who obtain a leaked JWT token from access logs, proxy logs, browser history, or Referrer headers can create persistent backdoor super-admin accounts and exfiltrate sensitive configuration and user data. |
| Grav before 2.0.0 (affected through 2.0.0-rc.9 and the 2.0 branch) contains a stored CSS injection vulnerability in the Markdown image resize() media action. Prior media hardening rejects direct ?style= payloads and unsafe attribute() fallbacks, but the resize() action in Excerpts::processMediaActions() writes caller-controlled values directly into the image's styleAttributes. A lower-privileged content editor who can edit page Markdown can store a crafted image URL with semicolon-delimited CSS declarations in the resize parameters, which are rendered into the final <img style=...> attribute when a higher-privileged reviewer/admin views the page or preview. This does not require JavaScript execution but enables UI redress/overlay and content-manipulation attacks (e.g., a full-viewport fixed overlay). Fixed in 2.0.0. |
| Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2. |
